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Abstract
The article analyzes the social construction of youth violence in Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, and El Salvador on the one hand, and the related security policies 
of the three states, on the other. In each country, there is an idiosyncratic 
way of constructing youth violence and juvenile delinquency. Also, each coun-
try has its own manner of reaction to those problems. In El Salvador youths 
are socially constructed as a threat to security, and the state implements 
predominantly repressive policies to protect citizens against that threat. In 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where the social discourse on youth violence is 
less prominent, the state’s policies are neither very accentuated nor very 
coherent, whether in terms of repressive or nonrepressive measures. There 
are strong relationships and mutual influences between the public’s fear (or 
disregard) of youth violence and the state’s policies to reduce it.
Keywords
Central America, youth violence, discourse analysis
Within the policy and research field of violence, crime, and insecurity in 
Latin America, analysts increasingly see violent and criminal behavior among 
youths as a crucial topic. In many countries, youth violence is identified as 
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one major cause of insecurity (see, for example, Fournier, 2000). In addition 
to the concerns raised from a mere security perspective, social actors and 
scholars focus on youth violence from other viewpoints as well; they discuss 
it, for instance, with regard to social and development policies. As approxi-
mately one-third of the Latin American population is under 15 years of age, 
social phenomena among youths are highly relevant to the present and future 
development of the region. On the other hand, in the field of violence and 
security studies, interest in the different phenomena, causes, and conse-
quences of youth violence began to boom when the debate on violence in 
Latin America shifted its focus from political to criminal and social violence, 
that is, from guerrilla warfare, state terrorism, and “dirty wars” to street delin-
quency, organized crime, gang violence, domestic violence, vigilante justice, 
and so forth (see, for example, Kurtenbach, 2005). Youth violence gains 
importance as an issue interrelated with many other problems: youths and 
petty crime, youths in gangs, violent youths as (former) victims of domestic 
violence, youths and drugs, and so on. The most prominent youth violence 
phenomenon in Latin America is the Central American—more exactly the 
Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran—maras, a special type of youth 
gang that originated in the context of emigration to and deportation from the 
United States.
This article argues that in some countries of Central America—and pre-
sumably in other parts of Latin America—specific groups of young people 
and, to a certain degree, the younger generation as a whole are socially con-
structed as a threat to citizen security (seguridad ciudadana). In particular, 
youth gang members are constructed as the number-one menace to the secu-
rity of the whole of Central America. In this vein, the persecution of youths 
in the name of seguridad ciudadana is legitimized and justified.
The analysis is organized as follows: First, the methodological and 
theoretical bases of the article are laid out. In particular, the terms seguridad 
ciudadana, youth violence, and discourse are operationalized. Then, some 
statistical data on youth violence are given in order to facilitate a rough notion 
of the empirical reality of that phenomenon in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
El Salvador. The next section examines the way in which the media, politi-
cians, scholars, and “common people” in the three countries discuss the issue 
of youth violence. Subsequently, the focus shifts to the policies undertaken in 
the three countries to reduce this phenomenon. The concluding section con-
nects the discursive and the policy dimensions, with the aim of detecting 
possible linkages between both, and reflects briefly on the relevance of the 
findings for Latin America.
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Methodological and Theoretical Considerations
This article is part of a research project that analyzes the origins, development, 
and institutionalization of the “talk of crime” (Caldeira, 2000) in Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, and El Salvador.1 The sample of countries was chosen to include 
a small number of cases that, in spite of their relative homogeneity as Central 
American nations, feature some differences generally assumed to be of high 
relevance in the violence and security context: The sample covers countries 
with a relatively low and a relatively high level of development (Nicaragua 
and El Salvador vs. Costa Rica), countries with and without a recent history 
of armed conflict (Nicaragua and El Salvador vs. Costa Rica), and countries 
with crime and violence problems perceived as high/increasing and low 
(El Salvador and Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua). The research design is not com-
parative in a strict sense: First, the three countries are analyzed not only as 
individual cases but also as part of Central America as one “bounded sys-
tem” (Stake, 2000). Second, the analysis does not pretend to detect causali-
ties between independent and dependent variables by comparing countries 
that feature those variables with countries that do not. The project and this 
article do not aim to explain why a given discourse exists or why a govern-
ment adopts a policy. Rather, the endeavor is to find out which discourses 
exist (and which of them are hegemonic) and what societal and political 
context they exist in.
Oettler (2007, pp. 27-28) summarizes some of the main results of the project 
as follows:
Public life in the three Central American countries . . . is shaped by the 
fear of crime, albeit with varying threat levels and different objects of 
fear. . . . [T]here are crossnational discursive leitmotivs. . . . The notion 
of organized youth violence has amounted to the most important fea-
ture of national and international debates on violent Central American 
“realities.”
Given the prominence of youth violence in the Central American discourses 
of violence, this article aims to provide a more detailed analysis regarding 
that topic. It focuses particularly on the social construction of youth violence 
on the one hand, and the youth violence–related security policies of govern-
ments in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador on the other.
The methodological approach of the project and, hence, of this article is to 
conduct a discourse-analytical examination of the talk of (youth) crime in the 
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three countries using a qualitative research design. The article does not intend 
to discover the “real” dimensions, causes, or consequences of violence in 
Central America. Instead, it focuses on the way the Central American societ-
ies treat the perceived security problems discursively. Therefore, it analyzes 
written and spoken statements of different powerful and less powerful speak-
ers in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.2
Empirically, the discourse analysis is based on sources gathered in the three 
countries in late 2006. The main sources consist of
1. Press articles: The research team examined the online-versions3 of 
the two most important daily newspapers of each country,4 taking 
into account all issues between 2004 and 2006. The team members 
copied all leading front-page articles5 related to violence or crime, 
totaling some 1,000 articles, into a database. Using computer soft-
ware for qualitative data analysis (“atlas.ti”) they categorized the 
articles into eight topic clusters, one of which was “crime/violence 
and youth.” From this subcorpus of approximately 250 articles, 
the author of this article defined 7 characteristic articles to be 
quoted here.
2. Party platforms and speeches of prominent politicians, both from 
government and opposition parties: The research team either down-
loaded these sources from the Internet or obtained them as hard cop-
ies during their field research. Between 20 and 30 of such documents 
were found for each country. For this article, all documents were 
screened for content related to youth violence or juvenile delin-
quency. Relevant passages were then extracted, compiled, and com-
pared to each other in order to identify “typical” quotes.
3. Scholarly texts: Since the beginning of the project (and before), the 
research team compiled and viewed secondary literature on violence 
in Central America. For this article, only texts focusing on youth vio-
lence and juvenile delinquency were taken into account.
4. Qualitative semistructured interviews: The members of the research 
team interviewed about 30 people in each in country. The aim of the 
interviews was not to gather “expert” information but to collect state-
ments (“speech acts”) on different aspects of the topic of violence 
from people as diverse as possible, in terms of socioeconomic back-
ground, profession, gender, age, and so on. Before going to the field, 
the researchers decided on a list of interviewee categories that had 
to be covered. Some categories were related to the research topic 
(e.g., one policeman in a rural and one in an urban area, security guard, 
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judge) others were not (bus driver, house maid, priest, business man, 
etc.). The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and “coded”—
similar to the press articles and the political documents—using 
the altas.ti-software.6 All interview passages regarding youth vio-
lence and crime were filtered out to be added to the specific corpus 
of this article.
5. Pupils’ essays: The data set also includes 226 brief texts written by 
pupils from 10 (3 in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 4 in El Salvador) rural 
and urban, marginal and elite schools. The majority of the pupils 
were between 14 and 17 years old. In a first step, the juveniles were 
only confronted with the following question: “Imagine you were 
the president of the country. What are the country’s most important 
problems and how would you solve them?” Thus, this question was 
not directly linked to the research question but rather allowed 
for a variety of answers related to the violence and security topic or 
not. The second question was, “Do you feel secure in your family/ 
neighborhood/village/town/country? Why/Why not?” The hand-
written answers were typed and also entered in the atlas.ti database, 
so that text passages referring to youth violence were easy to be 
picked out and to be utilized for this article.7
This selection of sources was chosen, first of all, to cover both powerful 
and less powerful speakers. The source selection also reflects the research 
project’s aim of achieving insights regarding the discourses that circulate in 
specific discursive spaces, in particular in the media, in the political arena, in 
the academic debate, and in “everyday discourse.”8 It is assumed here that 
the argumentative foundations of state responses to youth violence and 
juvenile delinquency are closely linked to the way youth crime is constructed 
in these discursive spaces.
The security policies are analyzed on the basis of the existing literature on 
the matter, the media coverage,9 and some of the previously mentioned quali-
tative interviews.10 Unlike the analysis regarding youth violence as such, the 
analysis of the related policies will not focus on the discursive dimension 
and will not discuss questions with respect to how knowledge about those 
policies is generated. Instead, it will analyze the security policies using “con-
ventional” (positivist) policy analysis. This is not a contradiction to the con-
structivist approach of this article. The inclusion of a non–discourse-analytical 
section is legitimate because the subject of this part of the analysis (security 
policies on youth violence) is much less a disputed “reality” than the sub-
ject of the discourse analysis (youth violence). And only this combination of 
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constructivism-inspired and positivist methods allows for the detection of the 
relationships between discourses and policies. From a policy analysis point 
of view, this research design is in line with Hajer’s (1993, p. 45) claim that 
“the real challenge for argumentative analysis is to find ways of combining 
the analysis of the discursive production of reality with the analysis of the 
(extradiscursive) social practice . . . .”
“Seguridad Ciudadana”
All over Latin America, government policies meant to prevent and/or combat 
youth violence are generally designed and implemented within the context of 
the state’s policies of seguridad ciudadana. The concrete meaning of segu-
ridad ciudadana varies significantly, depending on who uses it (and where, 
when, etc.).11 However, many authors agree that the term relates to two levels 
of reality. First, it refers to a condition or a state: to the absence of threats that 
could endanger the security of a person or a group. In this sense, the term has 
a highly normative meaning. It describes an ideal situation—probably inex-
istent in any part of the world but existing “as an objective to strive for” 
(Gonzáles, 2003, p. 17). Second, it refers to public policies aiming (but prob-
ably never managing) to achieve this ideal situation. In other words, it refers 
to policies that seek to eliminate security threats or to protect the population 
vis-à-vis these threats. In this latter sense, the term seguridad ciudadana 
refers to an empirically existent social practice.
Governments and other actors use the term seguridad ciudadana because it 
has the connotation of a preventive and, to a certain degree, liberal approach 
to problems of violence and crime—as opposed to merely repressive ways of 
addressing these issues.12 The expression as such emphasizes the protection of 
the citizen. It thus contrasts with the protection and defense of the state as 
postulated by the concept of seguridad nacional (national security), which 
dominated the public debate on security in past decades. The terminological 
shift suggests that the state now protects the physical integrity, property, and 
individual rights of all citizens. Yet the concept and practice of seguridad ciu-
dadana tend to create a difference between citizens who deserve protection 
and social groups considered to be a potential threat. Depending on the coun-
try, the latter may be, for example, drug addicts or dealers, ethnic groups, 
immigrants, or, as this article argues, youths. In a way, people who are part of 
these groups become the “criminal other” because the policies of seguridad 
ciudadana implicitly exclude them.13 Often, the state does not protect these 
people, and their human and civil rights are violated. This, in turn, is justified 
by the alleged need to protect those citizens considered to deserve protection.
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Youth Violence
When we categorize an act as juvenile delinquency or youth violence, we pick 
one of the many aspects of a given deed and define it as the distinctive one. 
Apart from the fact that the act is considered criminal or violent,14 the age 
of its perpetrator becomes the crucial characteristic by which to classify it.15 
Other aspects, such as the sex or ethnicity of the offender or the victim, the 
place where the “crime” was committed, the nature of the deed (theft, graffiti 
spraying, murder), and so forth, are not relevant for the categorization as 
youth violence. However, those other aspects might be highly important, for 
example, in terms of the offender’s motives, the methods used to prosecute 
the crime, or the society’s chances of preventing similar acts. The fact that one 
and the same crime (e.g., the assassination of a woman by a young migrant) 
may simultaneously be an act of youth violence, immigrant criminality, and 
femicidio (“femicide,” murder of a woman) shows that the way we perceive 
a phenomenon is heavily dependent on socially determined and historically 
mutable categories.
The Discourse Analytical Approach
From this constructivist point of view, youth violence exists by virtue of its 
being socially constructed; the dimensions and causes we attribute to it, as 
well as the approaches we invent to combat or prevent it, depend at least as 
much on the characteristics of this construction as on the behavior of a coun-
try’s youths. Therefore, this article contains only a very brief empirical intro-
duction to the dimensions of youth violence in Central America and does not 
aim to contrast the “reality” of youth violence or youth gangs16 in Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, and El Salvador with the social construction of that “reality.” 
Taking the constructivist approach seriously, it makes no sense to present 
exhaustive statistical data on homicides committed by juvenile offenders with 
the intent of unmasking a discourse as exaggerated or erroneous. Whether a 
discourse is right or wrong is not the issue here. Instead, this article aims to 
identify the specific characteristics of the discourses and address the question 
of whether and how the discourses are interrelated with the security policies 
of the respective countries.
The measures taken by governments and other actors are not “natural” 
reactions to a phenomenon such as youth violence. Rather, they depend on the 
specific perception each actor has of the problem, and this perception, in turn, 
is influenced by the public discourse regarding the phenomenon. The specific 
power relationships in a given society determine both the discourse and the 
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impact it has on policy making. A discourse is generated in multiple discur-
sive spaces, in which different actors compete regarding the definition and 
interpretation of specific violence and crime phenomena. Discourse is under-
stood here as a “regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of state-
ments” (Foucault, 2002, p. 90). By means of repetition and acceptance, a 
discourse is a condition and—at the same time—a consequence of collective 
practices: “Discourse is socially constitutive as well as shaped” (Fairclough & 
Wodak, 1997, p. 258). It constructs, transforms, and structures the collective 
practices. Contrary to the assumption that individual actors, such as politicians 
or the mass media, “create” or control opinions that are then accepted by 
society, Jäger (2004, p. 148) postulates that a discourse is hard to control:
No individual determines the discourse. A discourse is, so to speak, the 
result of all the many efforts people make to act in a society. What 
comes out is something that nobody wanted to come out like that, but 
which everybody has contributed to in different ways.
In spite of these self-generating dynamics, discourses are not produced in a 
chaotic way. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has claimed that the historical 
and ideological context in which a text (or any other discursive event) is pro-
duced has to be taken into account as much as the text itself (see, for example, 
van Dijk, 1999; Wodak, 2001).
The Empirical “Reality” of (Youth) Violence  
in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador
Despite the discourse analytical approach of this article, it is necessary to 
present some fundamental data on the magnitude of youth violence in the 
three countries analyzed. This empirical overview provides only a rough 
idea regarding the question whether the discourse is in any way congruent 
with the empirical reality of the respective countries or not. Crime statistics 
are themselves a product of discursive practices and tend to reflect police 
activity as well as socially constructed categories of offenses, victims, offend-
ers, and so forth (see, for example, Caldeira, 2000, pp. 106-115). Thus, the 
data given here should not be understood as a description of how serious 
the problem of youth violence in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador 
“really is” (or is not), but as a short insight into “what we think we know” 
about the issue.
In the Latin American, and especially in the Central American context, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica are both considered countries with relatively low 
levels of violence. In the academic and political debate, this is usually 
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substantiated citing the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. According 
to data provided by the UNDP-funded OCAVI-initiative (Observatorio 
Centroamericano sobre Violencia, Central American Violence Observatory), 
from 2003 to 2006, Nicaragua’s homicide rates have oscillated between 
12 and 13 and Costa Rica’s between 6 and 8 homicides per 100,000 inhab-
itants.17 Data regarding the question of how many homicides, or how many 
violent or criminal acts in general, are attributable to young offenders are 
hard to find for both countries, and the existing sources are not always 
complete and cross-nationally comparable. The Nicaraguan police (Policía 
Nacional, 2006, p. 55) published statistical information attributing 6.6% of 
all registered offenses in 2005 to juveniles. In 2006 the percentage decreased 
to 6.1% and in 2007 to 5.3% (Policía Nacional, 2008, p. 3). Neither the police 
nor other governmental or nongovernmental institutions in Nicaragua publish 
any information regarding the number (or the share) of homicides committed 
by minors. For Costa Rica, data from the country’s Yearbook of Judicial 
Statistics suggest that from all penal cases treated in the justice system, the 
share of cases in the juvenile justice system slightly decreased from 4.9% in 
both 2005 and 2006 to 4.7% in 2007.18 Neither the Yearbook nor other sources 
contain information on the percentage of (all kinds of) homicides committed 
by minors. Yet the source gives the following absolute numbers for “homi-
cidio doloso” (murder/intentional homicide) regardless of the age of the 
offender: 2005:300; 2006:338; 2007:357.19 In 2005 and 2007, the courts 
found 320 and 1621 minors guilty of homicide, respectively (no data for 2006). 
In a nutshell, according to the statistical information available, both Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua feature relatively low levels of (youth) violence.
El Salvador is considered one of the most violent countries in Latin America. 
This is primarily due a to a high homicide rate that increased from 37.3 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 to 55.3 in 2006, according to the OCAVI 
data. Regarding the contribution of youths to violence and crime in El Salvador, 
the Supreme Court’s Office for Juvenile Justice (Unidad de Justicia Juvenil, 
2007) published statistical data on juvenile delinquency. The share of criminal 
acts attributed to minors fluctuated from 5.61% in 2004, going up to 6.11% in 
2005, and down again to 5.47% in 2006. These official data, thus, do not sug-
gest a major or continuous increase. Juveniles seem to be responsible for 
about 6% of all crimes registered through the justice system. The same source 
also shows data on the share of homicides attributed to minors from 2000 to 
2004. It is somewhat higher and increased from 5.72% in 2000 to a peak of 
10.7% in 2003 and slightly decreased to 9.96% in 2004 (the source does not 
present data for later years). Considering the high overall homicide rate of the 
country, it is certainly no exaggeration to state that El Salvador is confronting 
a serious problem of (lethal) youth violence. While analyzing the discourse 
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on this phenomenon, it should be kept in mind, nevertheless, that there are 
still 10 times more homicides attributed to adults than to minors.
According to the official crime statistics presented here, the share of both 
penalized offenses in general and of homicides in particular committed by 
minors is relatively low in the three countries. Percentages of approximately 
6% or 10%, like those of El Salvador, must also be interpreted in light of the 
fact that in Central America, youth under 18 make up for a considerably higher 
share of the total population then, for example, in many OECD countries. In 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador 33%, 44%, and 39% of the popula-
tion, respectively, were under 18 in 2007.22
The Social Construction of Youth Violence  
in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador
This section aims to detect the hegemonic discourses on youth violence in 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. Therefore, not only are the discourses 
of “powerful” speakers, such as the media, politicians, and scholars, analyzed 
but also those of “less powerful” members of society, such as high school 
students. It is necessary to consider both “powerful” and “less powerful” 
speakers because a discourse can only be identified as hegemonic, first, if it 
is the discourse of the discursive elite, and, second, if nonelite members of 
society also accept it as “valid knowledge” (Jäger, 2004, p. 149). Regarding 
the discursive elite, in addition to that of political actors—whose (discursive 
and material) power does not need to be explained—the media’s and the 
academic community’s discourses are included in the analysis. The media, 
for example, high-circulation newspapers, not only reproduce and multiply 
opinions, they also produce and transform them (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 28). 
Especially in Central America, media are not only commercial institutions 
but are also pursuing a political agenda of their own (Huhn, Oettler, & Peetz, 
2006b, pp. 11-19). Scholars and the institutions they work for can be con-
sidered discursively “powerful” because they are important producers of the 
argumentative bases of the public debate. Their findings and interpretations 
are often (adapted and) reproduced in the media and in the political realm, and 
they influence governmental and nongovernmental decision makers through 
counseling.
The Media Discourse
As shown in a previous work (Huhn, Oettler, & Peetz, 2006b), in the two 
Nicaraguan newspapers analyzed (La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario), the 
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front-page articles on crime and security published in the years 2004-2006 
very rarely refer to problems of youth violence or juvenile delinquency. Other 
issues, such as drug-related crime or particular cases (of murder, fraud, viola-
tions, etc.), are much more prominent. Most of the (few) front-page articles 
in which youth violence is a central topic refer to youth gangs, either to the 
maras in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala or to Nicaraguan pandillas. 
For example:
[Headline] We kill our parents, if it is necessary/[Subhead]The major-
ity grew up in Latin ghettoes and neighborhoods of Los Angeles until 
they were deported to El Salvador and Tegucigalpa/[Sub-subhead] 
First, young combatants of the civil war, now a primary source of orga-
nized crime. (El Nuevo Diario, July 10, 2005)
or
[Headline] Violent gangs in night of fight/[Subhead] . . . Stones, 
machetes, tubes, and sticks were the objects used by the members of the 
gangs “The Possessed” and “Those from Below” and by their family 
members to attack five officers from the Fifth Police District. (La Prensa, 
October 4, 2004)
In quantitative terms, press coverage of youth violence in the Costa Rican 
newspapers (Al Día and La Nación) does not differ significantly from that in 
Nicaragua. Gangs also play an important role in (the few) youth violence-
related front-page articles, sometimes foreign maras, but mostly domestic 
pandillas (or chapulines as they are called in Costa Rica). For example:
[Headline] Neighborhoods of San José sieged by 15 youth gangs/
[Subhead] Gangs even have divisions consisting of delinquent children. 
(La Nación, June 6, 2004)
Also, Costa Rican newspapers publish front-page articles about another 
topic: youth violence and insecurity in schools and universities, as these head-
lines exemplify: “Drugs and violence unstoppable in [school] classes” (Al Día, 
February 28, 2005,), “Violence corrodes and burdens 200 schools” (La Nación, 
March 14, 2006). Whereas Nicaraguan newspapers refer to youth violence 
rather as a potential future issue (threatening to spill over from other parts of 
Central America in the form of maras), Al Día, and La Nación postulate that, 
in Costa Rica, serious problems of youth violence are already a reality.
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The two Salvadoran newspapers analyzed (El Diario de Hoy and La 
Prensa Gráfica) treat the topic of youth violence and especially that of youth 
gangs prominently. Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz (2006b) show that this obser-
vation is valid for both newspapers throughout the period under review 
(2004-2006). Apart from this quantitative evidence, it is also important to note 
that both the content and the wording of many of the newspaper articles tend 
to emphasize the seriousness of the mara problem. Headlines such as “Maras 
besiege Soyapango [a shanty town in the metropolitan area of San Salvador]” 
(El Diario de Hoy, April 25, 2004) or “297 homicides in May” (La Prensa 
Gráfica, June 1, 2006) are typical examples.
The Political Discourse
Alongside the media, other powerful speakers in the debate about youth 
violence and delinquency are political actors (political leaders, government 
officials, parties, parliamentary factions, NGOs, etc.). The sources analyzed 
(speeches of prominent politicians, party platforms, etc.) show that in Nicaragua 
youth violence is an issue rarely addressed in the political realm. The govern-
ment programs drafted by political parties in view of the 2006 general elections 
are a good example. In the 15-page Government Program of the now-ruling 
FSLN,23 the only reference to youth violence reads,
We are going to work on the issue of gangs in Nicaragua; we are ori-
ented towards social reintegration of their members as a form of solving 
the exclusion of those sectors in a social manner, and, at the same time, 
giving sustainability to citizen security. (Alianza Unidad, 2006, p. 12)
Not surprisingly, the only passage—located on page 44 of a total of 45—
referring to youth violence in the MRS’24 program sounds quite similar:
We are going to implement programs to work with youths organized 
in gangs and to promote their integration into the labor market and into 
community life. (Alianza MRS, 2006, p. 44)
Regarding the right-of-center parties, no ALN25 document containing the 
party’s or its presidential candidate’s plans concerning youth violence has been 
found. The policies the PLC26 proposes, in terms of seguridad ciudadana in 
general, seem to be inspired by the mano dura (iron-fist) rhetoric of success-
ful contenders in previous elections in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. 
Yet with regard to the particular issue of youth violence, it is difficult to find 
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any differences from the preventive and rehabilitation-oriented stances of 
FSLN or MRS:
We are going to strengthen citizen security, especially in neighborhoods 
with major population concentration, applying a zero-tolerance policy 
against delinquency. Also, we will encourage social reintegration of the 
juvenile groups at risk. (Alianza PLC, 2006, p. 37)
Regarding documents from political actors, the Costa Rican case is similar 
to the Nicaraguan in terms of the relatively low importance of youth violence 
within the broader context of insecurity. It is crucial to note, though, that this 
broader context is of much higher relevance in the public debate in Costa 
Rica than in Nicaragua. As for Nicaragua, there are rather few sources with 
any kind of “official” character (speeches of high-ranking politicians, party 
platforms, etc.) that explicitly address the issue of youth violence or juvenile 
delinquency. Sometimes, as in the following extract from then president 
Óscar Arias’ inaugural speech, youth and crime are only implicitly linked—
here, by connecting education with crime and by mentioning “school corridors” 
as a site of (small-scale) drug trafficking:
Education and security. From today on, we are going to adopt a clear 
course in public education. We are going to adopt a clear course in 
the fight against insecurity and drugs. We are going to be tough on 
delinquency, but even tougher on the causes of delinquency. We are 
going to deepen the preventive orientation of the Public Force [that 
is, the police] and we are going to provide it with more resources. We 
are going to fight drug trafficking relentlessly. And not only the big 
drug trafficking, but, in particular, small-scale drug trafficking, as it 
happens at the corners of our neighborhoods, in the parks of our com-
munities, at the doors and in the hallways of our schools. This will be 
one of the first priorities in terms of citizen security. (Arias Sánchez, 
2006, p. 6)
The quote also provides a good example of the government’s approach to 
reducing (juvenile) delinquency. In a way, Arias’ rhetoric resembles that of the 
Salvadoran government, as it advocates repressive policies in combination 
with preventive and rehabilitation-oriented measures. Apparently, there is no 
consensus among political actors in Costa Rica about this approach, at least 
not with regard to juvenile delinquency. The main opposition party, the leftist 
PAC,27 for example, issued a government program before the 2006 elections. 
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Although the program contains some “zero-tolerance” elements regarding 
drug-related crime, it appears to be unconditionally opposed to repression as 
a way of fighting juvenile delinquency:
We have to stop the hidden tolerance these groups [of organized crime] 
operate with in many neighborhoods of the capital and other cities of 
the country, as well as in rural areas, where the sale and the consump-
tion of drugs often happens in the presence of the authorities who let it 
happen with indifference.
Propositions:
–The attention to specific problems of children and youths with 
delinquent behavior and of youth gangs, by means of training programs 
that take into account their dignity, generate labor, and foster their inte-
gration in society.
–Prevention and rehabilitation of youths in marginalized rural 
and urban areas by means of a variety of social and educational pro-
grams and projects which respect them as human beings. (PAC, 2006, 
pp. 46-50)
The document explicitly refers to “youth gangs” (“pandillas juveniles”). 
The political class seems to be sharing the media’s view and depiction of 
youth violence as a twofold problem: of gangs on the one hand, and other 
problems (particularly drugs and violence in schools) on the other.
As to El Salvador, many leaders and organizations from different political 
camps portray juvenile delinquency, and in particular the maras, as one of the 
biggest problems the country is currently facing. To give only one of myriad 
possible examples, then President Saca declared the following in an address to 
the people of El Salvador on the second anniversary of his assumption of the 
presidency:
But it is in the issue of citizen security where we confront the biggest 
challenge. Organized crime and the delinquency of gangs constantly 
hit decent citizens, who are the immense majority, and this is an attack 
against the stability of the country. (Saca, 2006)
There are obvious linkages between the discourse of the government 
and the media discourse, not only regarding the general aspects (youth gangs 
depicted as one of the main problems of the country), but also in terms of more 
specific representations of gangs. For example, in September 2005, El Diario 
de Hoy (September 28, 2005) began to describe maras as parts of organized 
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crime networks, stating, “Recent police intelligence confirms the dramatic 
change the gangs have gone through, as they use the available infrastructure 
to commit crimes typical of organized crime.” In July 2006, La Prensa Gráfica 
(July 3, 2006) quoted then Interior Minister René Figueroa (talking about an 
initiative of the executive to reform the country’s penal code): “Figueroa . . . 
said that this reform is designed to treat gangs as ‘organized crime, linked 
with kidnapping, the drug trade, and contract killing’.”
As to the former opposition, now governing FMLN28 issued a platform 
for the 2004 elections that stated the following among 15 “Big Goals for El 
Salvador”:
7th, secure country: Progress of citizen security, the reduction of social 
violence, the overcoming of the mara problem, and the effective fight 
against all kind of crime and impunity. (FMLN, 2003, p. 18)
Still, in many newer sources from left-wing political actors such as FMLN, 
the issues of juvenile delinquency and youth gangs are not mentioned. For 
example, the Platform of Hope, published by the FMLN parliamentary faction 
in 2005, contains a section (section VIII) on violence and crime. Implicitly, it 
accuses the ARENA29 government of being responsible for “the avalanche of 
homicides that has grown, even tripled, during the governments of Flores and 
Saca” (FMLN, 2005, p. 19). But nowhere in the document does the party 
directly address juvenile delinquency or youth gangs. It can only be specu-
lated that those leftist actors were deliberately trying not to contribute to what 
they saw as a security paranoia—from which only the right has managed to 
benefit at the ballot box.
The Academic Discourse
In the academic debate on violence and insecurity in Nicaragua, a consider-
able corpus of literature on youth-specific topics, particularly youth gangs, 
has emerged in the past few years (e.g., DIRINPRO, NITLAPAN, & IDESO, 
2004; Rocha, 2005, 2007; Rodgers, 2007). This is in contrast to the relatively 
low profile these topics have had, as we have seen, in the media and in the 
political arena. Presumably, the fact that—outside Central America—maras 
are known as a “Central American” problem has contributed to this academic 
overrepresentation of gang issues in Nicaragua as well as in Costa Rica. One of 
the most important publications on youth gangs in Central America, the 
four volumes of Maras y Pandillas en Centroamérica (Cruz, 2006; ERIC, 
IDESO, IDIES, & IUDOP, 2001, 2004; ERIC, IDIES, IUDOP, NITLAPAN, 
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& DIRINPRO, 2004), is a typical example: Despite all the differences between 
Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran maras on the one hand, and Nicaraguan 
pandillas on the other, each volume includes one chapter on the Nicaraguan 
case just as it does for the three other countries (the case of Costa Rica, though, 
is not included). Also, it seems that Nicaragua’s past, marked by revolution 
and armed conflict, has drawn some attention to the country’s (few) gangs 
and has turned it into a more interesting study subject than, for example, 
Honduran maras.
In the case of Costa Rica, it can be assumed that the academic infrastruc-
ture, which is relatively well developed in comparison to all other Central 
American countries, allows for the inclusion of a topic such as youth gangs 
on the agenda, even if it may not be a key problem for the country itself (but 
rather for its neighbors). In this context, it is important to note that, when 
scholars from Costa Rica study youth gangs in other parts of the isthmus—
especially when they publish their results in Costa Rica—this has to be con-
sidered part of the Costa Rican (and Central American) academic discourse 
on youth violence. Nevertheless, Nicaraguan and Costa Rican scholarly lit-
erature on youth gangs and youth violence is, in quantitative terms, not com-
parable to that of El Salvador.
In El Salvador, youth violence and gang activity can currently be considered 
the number-one issue. The corpus of literature on these matters has grown 
exponentially in recent years30 and some of the most recognized research insti-
tutions of the country, such as IUDOP,31 have focused on these themes and 
have participated in conferences and symposia with high public visibility. In 
general, the viewpoint of the scholars working on El Salvador does not differ 
much from the media’s and many politicians’ point of view, particularly in terms 
of one fundamental aspect: Youth violence, and the maras in particular, are 
depicted as one of the country’s biggest problems and as a serious threat to 
public security. There are a number of disagreements, both among researchers 
and between them and political actors or the media, regarding specific aspects 
of the issue, for example, the size and characteristics of the gangs or the way 
youth violence could or should be prevented or combated. But there is a broad 
consensus about the prime importance of the subject for El Salvador among 
Salvadoran and international researchers alike.32
The “Everyday Discourse”
To investigate if and how the discourse of the media, political actors, and 
scholars corresponds with (or contradicts) the discourse of other, less powerful, 
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members of society, brief texts drafted by students and interviews with peo-
ple from different social backgrounds were analyzed.
In both Nicaragua and Costa Rica the issue of youth violence is only of 
marginal importance in the students’ texts. In their answers to the open, not 
violence-related question about the most urgent problems of the country, only 
three participants in Nicaragua and none in Costa Rica mention youth vio-
lence or juvenile delinquency as a major problem (Table 1). In the case of the 
three relevant answers from Nicaragua, two contain an explicit reference to 
youth gangs. “Talia,”33 from a public school in Managua, writes,
First, the most urgent problems are the gangs, drugs, theft, etc. I would 
solve it by placing police in every spot where the thefts occur; the gangs 
should search for god because god can change them and take care of 
them wherever they may be.
The third one refers to street delinquency perpetrated by youths in general, 
not necessarily by gangs:
Invest in education: delinquency in the country would be reduced, 
because youths would not hang out in the streets anymore. (“Xelene,” 
from a private school in Managua)
As to the interviews, the differences between Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
are more significant. In Nicaragua, for 10 of the interview partners, youth 
violence, particularly pandillas, is an important topic. In Costa Rica, the odd 
interviewee mentions youth violence or youth gangs, but no one addresses 
Table 1. Youth Violence as a Central Theme in Pupils’ Answers
Private 
school
Urban public 
school(s) Rural school
 NI CR SV NI CR SV1 SV2 NI CR SV
Total participants per school 19 20 19 27 24 25 27 21 20 10
1st (open) question 1  0 16  2  0 11 13  0  0  6
2nd question (related to 
personal security)
5  0  4  3  0 14 20  1  0  4
Notes: NI = Nicaragua; CR = Costa Rica; SV = El Salvador (two urban public schools in El 
Salvador).
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the issue in such a way that it could be assumed he or she considers it a central 
security problem. In Nicaragua, for example, a Managua nurse, when asked 
about street violence, says,
Ah, street violence has increased enormously; I mean, the majority 
of the patients we treat here, the vast majority are due to violence, 
that is, fights between gangs, aggressions when a person is robbed. 
That has increased much more than the other kind of violence—
domestic.
To the question, “What role do the gangs play? Are there many gangs here 
in Managua?,” she answers,
A lot of gangs, too many gangs, too many gangs and also there are 
many—we call them thieves, that means, people who steal. Maybe, the 
gangs do not steal from you. The gangs, what they generate is insecurity 
in the neighborhoods, because they fight against each other because of 
drugs.
Apparently, in Nicaragua there is a phenomenon that occurs inversely 
in Costa Rica: Although for many Nicaraguan “common people” youth gangs 
and other forms of youth violence are an important cause of concern, the 
dominant speakers in the public discourse (with the notable exception of the 
social science community), that is, the media and political leaders and institu-
tions, tend to ignore or implicitly downplay the problem. In Costa Rica, poli-
ticians, scholars, and, to a limited extent, the media tend to give the issue a 
higher profile than less powerful speakers do.
For El Salvador, both the students’ texts and the interviews reveal a high 
level of concern—and fear—vis-à-vis gang and youth violence. Table 1 shows 
that in El Salvador a majority of participants (46 out of 81 students) in the 
“school experiment,” responding to the open, not violence-related question, 
mention youth violence as a major problem in the country. For example, 
“Dominic,” from a public secondary school in the center of San Salvador, 
writes,
As president, the first thing I would do is the gang problem; it would be, 
if the gang member quits the gang or, at least, behaves well, I would see 
the report to consider his progress and then decide whether to let him out 
of prison or not.
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Interestingly, in the answers to the not-violence-related question, a higher 
proportion of pupils from the private school and from the rural school than 
from the urban public schools refer to youth violence as an important problem 
in the country.34 Yet in the second question, directly asking for personal expe-
riences with security/insecurity, the proportion of private school children who 
refer to maras or other youth violence phenomena is low. In contrast, in the 
urban public schools many participants report having had such problems per-
sonally.35 The students of the private school, who usually have an upper 
middle-class background—which, in El Salvador, includes certain security 
standards—seem to be more reflective about youth violence than their peers 
from the public school, even if, for the latter, maras pose a much more imme-
diate threat.36
Many Salvadoran interview partners also express their preoccupation with 
youth violence and the maras.37 The following short extracts of two of the 
interviews illustrate this: Answering the question, “And how do you perceive 
the situation of the country, El Salvador, and also of the city here, in terms of 
violence?” a taxi driver says,
Yes, there is quite a lot of violence, there is very, very much violence. 
It has increased because . . . the government has not put much interest 
in it. The laws are very weak for the youngsters who are gang members.
Asked about the differences between the situation during the civil war and 
today, a consultant from a German company’s Salvadoran office responds,
Well, let’s put it simply, at the times of the civil wars, it was kind of a 
social movement. . . . Today, there is simply the threat that the socioeco-
nomic context has become negative because of the massive population 
growth, because young people have hardly any chance of finding a 
meaningful job. . . . And what makes the situation somewhat difficult is, 
very simply, that these people, these young people, organize in youth 
gangs, which originated in the USA.
Comparing the Discourse of Powerful  
and Less Powerful Speakers
In light of the above analysis of the sources, it can be confirmed that youth 
violence, and the mara issue in particular, are depicted by both powerful and 
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less powerful speakers in El Salvador as one of the country’s main prob-
lems. Furthermore, the selected quotes indicate which security policies those 
speakers see as the appropriate ones in the attempt to tackle these problems. 
Whereas the citations reflect a rather repressive approach, there are a consid-
erable number of sources, especially academic texts and interviews, which 
reveal a more liberal way of thinking, particularly through an emphasis on 
prevention or on the need to fight the “deeper causes” of the violence (poverty, 
lack of education, lack of values, etc.). Apparently, within the consensus about 
the gravity of the issue of youth and gang violence, there are competing 
opinions about the way to solve those problems. Yet with the most influen-
tial media companies, the ARENA government, and other powerful actors 
(e.g., the business-friendly think tank FUSADES38) on its side, the repres-
sive approach was the hegemonic one at the time of the study.
However, as to the discourse of the Salvadoran governments, the sources 
show that, at least since former President Saca took office in 2004, the repres-
sive discourse against maras has been combined with one of prevention and 
rehabilitation. An example is this passage from Saca’s inaugural speech on 
June 1, 2004:
We are going to use “Super Iron Fist” to bring the delinquents before 
the law, but at the same time we will lend our hand to avoid that those who 
are in risk become delinquents and to rescue and rehabilitate those who 
want to be reintegrated into society. (Saca, 2004)
The 2004 government program of then ruling ARENA party also empha-
sizes this combination of repressive and nonrepressive measures:
There will be special concentration on the particular situation of gangs, 
both in terms of prevention and sanctions and in terms of the reintegra-
tion of their members into society. (ARENA, 2004, p. 11)
As the next section of this article argues, this combination strategy is 
(at most) only halfheartedly implemented in actual policies and thus mainly 
exists on the rhetorical level. But nevertheless, an interesting result of this 
analysis is the finding that there is significant congruence between the govern-
ment’s discourse on how to reduce youth gang violence on the one hand, and 
the opinions most of our interview partners express on the other. Twenty-two 
interviewees in El Salvador make a statement about what kind of solution 
they see to insecurity.39 Of these 22, 13 demand measures that can be categorized 
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as repressive; 20 argue for nonrepressive action.40 Thus, 11 of the 13 who argue 
for repression also want nonrepressive policies to be implemented, and 
only 2 of the 22 want exclusively repressive measures. A police officer from 
San Salvador, for example, complains about judges who, in his view, are too 
permissive:
What are the law reforms good for, if, at the end, the judges do not 
implement the laws, do not judge according to sanity and reason?
Nevertheless, later on, he takes a more preventive, education- and value-
oriented (although at the same time control-oriented) stance:
Security is everybody’s matter. It is the priest’s matter, the mayor’s; it 
is the teachers’ matter; it is the taxi drivers’ matter; it is the matter of all 
of us who belong to society. The responsibility of the priest is to guide 
the believers. If he knows a woman’s son who already tends towards 
delinquency, well, bring him to church and start to indoctrinate him 
according to the doctrine of the church. So he can see if he can save 
him, as they say, save his soul. That way, they have already generated 
security.
Apparently, the discourse of the government and that of many “ordinary 
people” about how to confront (youth) violence have much in common in El 
Salvador. And even if the sources do not allow assumptions in terms of causal 
relations, they do suggest there is at least some kind of close interrelatedness 
and (presumably mutual) influence between the two discursive spheres.
In sum, in Nicaragua, youth violence seems to be treated as being of rather 
marginal relevance by powerful speakers, such as politicians or the media. It 
is depicted as being of slightly higher importance by other, less powerful, 
members of society. In Costa Rica, where violence and crime in general 
are a much-discussed topic in all spheres of society (Huhn, 2008), youth 
violence in particular is more prominently addressed by political actors, 
academic authors, and the media than by “common people.” For El Salvador, 
the sources show that youth violence and particularly the mara gangs are seen 
throughout society as the country’s main security problem. It seems that for 
some parts of Salvadoran society, the gangs are in fact the only important 
security issue. The fear of youth violence is so intense and ubiquitous that not 
only (alleged) gang members but also the entire younger generation come 
under suspicion.41
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Government Policies to Reduce Youth Violence 
in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador
This section will examine the government policies designed to counter juve-
nile delinquency and youth violence in the three Central American countries. 
It will also point out whether and how these policies correspond with the 
hegemonic discourse on those subjects in the three societies. For Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, much information on the governments’ anti-youth-violence 
policies is available in the existing literature, in the case of Nicaragua 
especially in the works of the Managua-based researcher José Luis Rocha. 
Due to the lack of relevant scholarly analyses regarding Costa Rica, in con-
trast, the section regarding that country relies more on information gathered 
in interviews and through media monitoring.
Nicaragua
For Nicaragua, Rocha (2005, 2006, 2007) and Rocha and Bellanger (2004) 
have analyzed the state’s reaction to youth violence and in particular to youth 
gangs. There seems to be a substantial difference between the official policies, 
as they become manifest in laws, directives, budgets, and so on, on the one 
hand, and the actual performance of lower-ranking policemen or other state 
representatives directly confronted with the problem on the other. On the 
official level, the institutional history of the Nicaraguan police, the Policía 
Nacional (National Police), is one of the main reasons the state has not opted 
for a repressive approach to youth violence.
The highest positions in the National Police are held by approximately 
forty former combatants of the revolution; they occupy the highest ech-
elons and are divided into two networks: the traditional economic elite 
network and the FSLN network. (Rocha, 2005, p. 3)
Both power groups inside the police have no interest in introducing 
iron-fist policies. The “traditional economic elite network” wants to present 
Nicaragua as a country with low criminality and, thus, high attractiveness for 
foreign investments. Extensive repressive measures and the public attention 
they provoke would make it difficult to uphold that image. The “FSLN net-
work,” in turn, formerly had an interest—at least until Daniel Ortega won the 
elections in 2006—in maintaining a positive relationship with the pandillas, 
because Sandinismo saw the gangs as potential support groups for public 
unrest. Moreover,
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on February 3, 2014yas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Peetz 1481
the Sandinista elite’s ability to use sociological terms and concepts and 
their notoriously superior discursive capacity in relation to their Central 
American colleagues enabled the appearance of innovative proposals 
and an assessment of citizen security that deepened the analysis of youth 
gangs without criminalising their members. (Rocha, 2005, p. 5)
Instead of tightening repression, the Policía Nacional focuses on community-
based rehabilitation; this may include negotiating armistices between pandil-
las, finding (or helping to create) work opportunities for ex-gang members, 
and so on.
Together with the police, the parliament and other state institutions have 
also fostered a nonrepressive, preventive, and rehabilitation-oriented approach 
to confronting youth violence in Nicaragua. In particular, the approval of the 
Code of Childhood and Adolescence in 1998 and the instauration of a Special 
Ombudsman’s Office for Children and Adolescents in 2000 were of para-
mount importance in this context. Both were not so much a consequence of 
the ideological conviction of the legislators as an effect of the then ruling 
party’s (PLC) efforts to show compliance with foreign donors’ demands for 
the strengthening of human rights and the rule of law (Rocha & Bellanger, 
2004, p. 325). Nevertheless, the code and the office, together with subsequent 
legislation and institutional reforms,42 have reinforced the approach of the 
police. They promote the idea that youth violence should not be treated pri-
marily as a security problem, but as a problem of social integration, education, 
health, and human rights. The implementation of this set of legal and institu-
tional changes has been clearly reflected in the judiciary’s dealings with juve-
nile offenders since then: “The number of adolescents deprived of liberty 
decreased from 449 in 1998 to only 36 in 2003” (Rocha, 2005, p. 7).
Still, the picture of the nonrepressive handling of youth-violence problems 
in Nicaragua has to be redrawn when the behavior of the police on the local 
level is taken into account.43 For Managua, Maclure and Sotelo (2003, p. 681) 
note that measures against pandillas such as the Plan for Integral Development 
against Youth Violence are, fundamentally, of a repressive nature:
Although the plan was couched in language that referred to the educa-
tion and rehabilitation of young delinquents, . . . [its] guiding principle 
. . . was that of crime control. Accordingly, police units were mandated 
to crack down on youth violence by arresting known gang leaders and 
indicting them for criminal offenses. . . . [M]ore than 400 adolescents 
in Managua, many under 15 years old, had been systematically rounded 
up and incarcerated by the police, without judicial warrants.
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Furthermore, Rocha (2005, p. 10) pinpoints another factor undermining the 
official, nonrepressive approach of the central authorities:
Due to the ideological, social, and generational gap between the major-
ity of police officers and those at the highest echelons, most policemen 
do not act according to their superiors’ discourse.
Thus, excessive police violence against youths is widespread. A report 
of the Ombudsman’s Office states that 47% of adolescents detained by the 
police have been mistreated (PDDH, 2002, p. 93). In 2005, a survey among 
children and adolescents cast a similar light on what is going on in many 
police stations:
Police facilities are perceived as insecure places. As to the actions of 
some policemen, the consulted persons had observed corruption, physi-
cal and sexual violence . . . , arbitrary action, and transgressions in the 
detention procedures for adolescents or children. . . . (CONAPINA & 
CODENI, 2005, p. 60)
Despite these problems of implementation that Nicaragua’s “official” pol-
icies to reduce youth violence must face—problems all other countries of the 
isthmus also have to deal with, to a varying degree—the overall trend in the 
past 10 years has been the favoring of a human and children’s rights–based 
approach implying only a minimal amount of repression. This makes 
Nicaragua different from all other Central American countries; in particular, 
the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have decided to 
resort to the rhetoric and practice of the iron fist (see below for the example 
of El Salvador).
Costa Rica
It is very difficult to describe the Costa Rican state’s policies with respect 
to youth violence or juvenile delinquency because reliable information 
on this matter is extremely hard to find, even in Costa Rica itself. This 
seems to indicate, first, that there are no high-profile government policies 
in this field and, second, that the policies implemented do not generate 
much concern or criticism in the press, among scholars, or among NGOs 
(where the project researchers searched for information). Apparently, 
there has been no major policy change, either toward repressive or toward 
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antirepressive policies, since the introduction of the Juvenile Justice Penal 
Code in 1996.
This law, just like the Code of Childhood and Adolescence in Nicaragua, 
applies the norms of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child to Costa 
Rican legislation. It is considered a major step and a paradigmatic change 
from castigatory law to a rehabilitation-oriented approach based on human 
and children’s rights. As one of the sources revealed,44 this general bias of the 
code was pushed through mainly by international cooperation agencies such 
as UNICEF and by technical advisors who drafted the code’s wording. The 
legislators themselves seem to have been less convinced than the approbation 
of the law may suggest: In a last-minute change, they increased the maximum 
imprisonment for those under 18 years of age from 5 years, as the technical 
commission recommended, to 15 years (Article 131). They thus created a 
certain contradiction between the general antirepressive bias of the code and 
this specific stipulation, which made Costa Rica one of the countries with the 
longest maximum prison sentences for adolescents worldwide. Yet according 
to an official statement of the Costa Rican government (quoted in DNI, 2004, 
p. 31), the maximum sentence has been imposed only once.
The actual practice of prosecution and jurisdiction is seemingly less dra-
conic than the legislators who approved the law intended. In a way, this is the 
opposite of what occurs in Nicaragua. In the latter, a fundamentally antirepres-
sive official policy is only halfheartedly implemented, so that youths, to a 
certain degree, are exposed to repressive actions; in the former, the difference 
between official strategy and concrete implementation further softens a some-
what ambiguous approach. As the few sources we found indicate, government 
policies regarding youth violence and juvenile delinquency lost some of 
this ambiguity with the coming into office of the Arias administration (May 
2006). They now seem to tend more exclusively towards a preventive and 
rehabilitation-oriented approach. The National Plan for the Prevention of 
Violence and the Promotion of Social Peace (see Ministerio de Justicia, n.d.), 
issued by the Justice Ministry, does not reveal any plans for repressive action 
against adolescents. On the contrary, the plan highlights the government’s aim 
both to strengthen existing programs and to create new prevention and reha-
bilitation initiatives in the fields of education, labor market integration, recre-
ation and sports, political participation, and so on. According to Costa Rican 
crime statistics, juvenile delinquency appears to have decreased slightly in 
recent years (Costa Rica Poder Judicial, 2007, p. 35). It is impossible for the 
author of this article, however, to assess whether this decrease is due to gov-
ernment policies or to other factors.
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El Salvador
Until recently,45 the government of El Salvador has clearly favored repressive 
measures, the so-called mano dura (iron-fist) policies, to reduce delinquency 
in general and youth gang violence in particular.46 Police forces have steadily 
grown in terms of budget and staff. The government has increasingly involved 
the military in combating youth gangs—to the extent that the armed forces 
have managed to regain much of the domestic power they had gradually lost 
following the end of the civil war. The police and the military patrol the cities 
and carry out massive operations, especially in neighborhoods known to be 
affected by mara activities. In these operations, security forces make exten-
sive use of weapons and other military equipment (armored cars, helicopters, 
etc.) and detain and kill high numbers of suspected youth gang members. 
Often, youths are arrested on the grounds of being tattooed, a distinctive—
though not an exclusive—sign of gang members. Shortly afterwards, many of 
the detained adolescents and young adults have to be released because of a 
lack of substantial evidence that they have committed a crime.
In the past, this situation led to harsh conflicts between the government and 
the judiciary, in particular the judges: Representatives of the executive author-
ities accused judges of not sentencing young criminals and of sabotaging the 
government’s anticrime policies. The judges, in turn, blamed the prosecuting 
institutions for not providing the necessary evidence. Therefore, beginning in 
mid-2006, the government has shifted its strategy from massive arrests, which 
have since become less frequent, to more selective, intelligence-intensive 
operations. This strategy change was preceded by a gradual but clearly trace-
able alteration in the way both government officials and the media depicted 
maras: Before late 2005, the gangs were generally characterized as a massive 
and dangerous, though largely locally based, phenomenon of youth culture. 
Since then, newspaper coverage and the statements of security authorities 
have strongly emphasized the gangs’ international connections and their rela-
tionships to the drug trade—creating the image of maras as “organized crime” 
and downplaying their subcultural and youth-cultural background.
The repressive measures against youth gangs enacted by the authorities 
have been accompanied by changes in the legislation. These legal changes 
tend to restrict the civil rights of the citizens or of specified groups of the 
population, such as minors. In 2003 the Salvadoran parliament passed the 
Anti-Maras Law. Ultimately, the Supreme Court annulled the law because it 
violated the constitution and international treaties the country had signed. 
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The law would have given judges the right to judge minors between 12 and 
17 years as adults if they were members of a youth gang. In 2004, the legis-
lature enacted the Law for the Combat of Delinquent Activities of Special 
Illicit Groups or Associations. It did not include the regulations the court had 
ruled out with regard to the Anti-Maras Law, and it was designed as a tempo-
rary law, expiring after 90 days. But it still increased punishments for minor 
and adult gang members and restricted their legal rights. In early 2007, the 
Law against Organized Crime and Offenses of Complex Realization came 
into force. Designed with the intention of accelerating criminal procedures, 
the law creates special tribunals for homicides, kidnappings, and extortions 
perpetrated by “structured group[s] of two or more persons.” It also enables 
the prosecution authorities to carry out “covert operations” and to use “any 
technical instrument or skill of transmission, recording of sound, image, or 
any other communication signal.” This means the law makes trials for some 
of the most serious offenses faster and expands the possibilities for covert 
investigations. More important, it defines offenses considered typical of the 
Salvadoran youth gangs—homicides and extortions—as acts of organized 
crime. Thus, it turns the government’s depiction of maras as structures of orga-
nized crime into a formal legal norm.
According to Salvadoran crime statistics, the repressive policies against 
youth violence in El Salvador have, so far, not been successful in reduc-
ing (youth) violence. They may even be assessed as counterproductive.47 
Nonetheless, the ARENA government kept unwilling to change its approach 
to tackling youth crime. Measures aiming at prevention and rehabilitation, 
such as the programs mano amiga (friendly hand) and mano extendida (out-
stretched hand), were fundamentally underfunded and can thus not be consid-
ered a serious step toward less repressive policies. The report of the National 
Commission for Citizen Security and Social Peace (Comisión Nacional, 2007, 
p. 51) concluded:
The programs to prevent and treat youth violence that have been imple-
mented in the country so far have been limited in scope, focused on 
some municipalities, with low levels of coordination between the insti-
tutions responsible for their implementation. They have not managed to 
cover an important part of the population exposed to major risks. . . . 
Regarding programs of reintegration and social rehabilitation of youth 
gang members and young offenders they are even more limited than 
prevention initiatives.
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Concluding Remarks: Seguridad Ciudadana and 
the Talk of Youth Crime in Central America
In the three countries analyzed, the public discourse on youth violence can 
be summarized as a mixture of viewpoints locatable on a continuum between 
favoring repression on the one hand, and advocating preventive, rehabilitation- 
and human rights–based policies on the other. Every country has a specific 
“mix ratio” of these viewpoints, Nicaragua being located rather on the 
nonrepressive side, Costa Rica somewhere in the middle, and El Salvador 
on the more repressive side. But neither in Nicaragua nor in El Salvador can 
the discourses be described as purely nonrepressive or purely repressive. In 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where the social discourse on youth violence—
compared to El Salvador—is less prominent in the public debate and less 
homogeneous between powerful and not so powerful speakers, the state poli-
cies are neither very accentuated nor very coherent, whether in terms of repres-
sive or nonrepressive measures. In El Salvador, the state’s response to youth 
violence and juvenile delinquency coincides with a generalized public fear 
regarding these phenomena.48 This congruence also applies to particular aspects 
of youth crime policy. One example of this is the shift in the depiction of youth 
gangs (in the media and government discourse) from a youth culture problem 
to one of organized crime, parallel to a corresponding shift in the authorities’ 
strategies to combat the gangs. In the “everyday discourse” and among poli-
ticians in El Salvador a kind of hybrid discourse has developed, which com-
bines the advocating of both repressive and preventive action. But, during 
the ARENA government, the actual policies did not shift toward such bal-
anced combination.
In El Salvador youths in general are socially constructed as a potential threat 
to security. Youth gang members in particular are constructed as the “criminal 
others” from whom society has to be protected by means of specific seguridad 
ciudadana policies. The same might also apply in the cases of Guatemala and 
Honduras, which appear to be similar to El Salvador, but (because of the 
limited geographical scope of the sources analyzed for this article) this can-
not be substantiated here. For Nicaragua and Costa Rica, neither social dis-
course nor governmental policies suggest that adolescents in general are being 
stigmatized as a security threat. A closer look at the sources would be neces-
sary, though, to check whether there are particular groups of young people, 
for example, young drug addicts, young immigrants, and so on, who are sys-
tematically constructed as the dangerous “Other.” In any case, it seems that in 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica there are other characteristics than simply “being 
young” that turn a person into a source of fear and an object of security 
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policies. Nevertheless, maras are constructed as an imminent (Costa Rica) or 
only possible (Nicaragua) threat, and the governments of both countries have 
taken part in an increasing number of regional and international initiatives to 
fight the gangs.
The analysis of the three countries as individual cases and as a “bounded 
system” has provided a differentiated insight into the discourse on youth vio-
lence in Central America. Given the uncontested prominence of the mara issue 
in the region’s (youth) violence debate, the focus of most of the relevant litera-
ture is on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, with the perception that 
these are the countries with a massive mara presence and that they have a 
higher prevalence rate of crime and violence problems. This article has taken 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua fully into account and has shown that even in one 
of these “non-mara countries,” Costa Rica, the discourse on youth violence is 
an important topic in some discursive spaces, although not as important as in 
El Salvador. Thus, it is not necessarily the presence of youth gangs that draws 
public attention to the issue of youth violence. Moreover, as the depiction of 
maras as an imminent or future threat in Costa Rica and Nicaragua shows, the 
youth gang problem—or, more exactly, the discourse regarding it—in one part 
of the “bounded system” has produced significant effects on the way youth 
violence is discursively treated in other parts of the system.
On the basis of the sources analyzed in this article, it is not possible to 
draw conclusions concerning causal relationships between discourse and 
policies. However, the analysis suggests that there is a strong relationship and 
mutual influence between the public’s fear (or disregard) of youth violence 
and the state’s policies to reduce that kind of violence. Based on the explor-
ative findings of the qualitative research presented in this article, it is possible 
and necessary to conduct more and differently designed research to deter-
mine what the causal linkages between discourse and policy in the field of 
youth violence in Central America are. Also, further research efforts should 
be undertaken to discover why, how, and by whom the discourses are origi-
nally generated and what the power relationships that cause them to become 
hegemonic—and relevant in the policy-making process—are. This kind of 
“archeology” (in the Foucaultian sense of the word) would help in under-
standing the deeper roots of anti–youth-crime policies that in some countries 
such as El Salvador, tend to disregard human and children’s rights.
Overall, it seems fruitful, not only for Central America but also for other 
Latin American countries, to emphasize the social discourse on violence and 
crime while researching public policies that address these problems. The con-
cept of seguridad ciudadana is not specific to Central America; it is present 
and relevant all through Latin America. In each context, there may be other 
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groups of citizens marked by society as the “criminal others” from whom 
society has to be protected, be they immigrants, ethnic minorities, a specific 
age group, drug consumers, football fans, or whoever. In this article, it has 
been shown that one of these demonized groups can be a whole generation, 
as in El Salvador. Political and social actors across Latin America should be 
aware that such “intergenerational apartheid” (Lock, 2006) has damaging 
effects for democracy, human rights, and development in the region. They 
should design policies not only to prevent juvenile delinquency and youth 
violence—as states and civic organizations increasingly do—but also to pre-
vent societies from defining their own adolescents as a threat to the citizens’ 
security.
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Notes
 1. The project “Public Spaces and Violence in Central America” at the GIGA Institute 
of Latin American Studies (see http://www.giga-hamburg.de/projects/violence-
and-discourse) is funded by the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).
 2. The division of speakers into more and less powerful members of society is based 
on the concept of “discursive power” as used in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA); 
see for example, van Dijk, 2001, pp. 352-371.
 3. Note that the online versions sometimes differ from the printed versions.
 4. In each country, the two newspapers with the highest circulation were chosen. In 
Nicaragua La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario, in Costa Rica La Nación and Al Día, 
and in El Salvador La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy.
 5. On the particular relevance of front pages and front-page headlines, see Huhn, 
Oettler, and Peetz (2006b, p. 9).
 6. See Oettler (2008, pp. 11-16) for detailed information on how the interviewees 
were selected, how the interviews were processed, and so on.
 7. The pupils’ essays were documented in Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz (2008b). The 
volume also includes detailed information on the characteristics of each school, 
the practical procedure of generating this part of the data set, and the main results 
of the “school experiment.” For a methodological evaluation, see Oettler (2008).
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 8. On the definition of “everyday discourse” used in the project, see Huhn (2008).
 9. For the reconstruction of the security policies, in addition to the newspapers 
included in the data corpus of the discourse analysis, other media, especially 
online newspapers and news services, were consulted.
10. Some of the interviews, though conducted primarily with the intention of gener-
ating discursive events to be analyzed in the discourse analysis, have many char-
acteristics of “expert interviews.” Some interviewees, such as criminologist and 
judge Douglas Durán in Costa Rica, can undoubtedly be considered “experts.”
11. For example, there is no consensus as to whether seguridad ciudadana also 
refers to nonintentional (traffic accidents, natural disasters) or economic and 
social risks and threats.
12. By “repressive” I mean measures (against actual, assumed or potential perpe-
trators of violent or criminal acts) that include the use or the threat of using 
(counter)violence. Repressive security policies consist of, for example, armed 
operations of the police or the military aiming at arresting (or killing) assumed 
criminals. The repressive approach, typically, is based on the idea of punishment 
and deterrence. Nonrepressive approaches, in contrast, embrace alternative 
methods such as prevention, reintegration of offenders into society, restorative 
justice, and fighting the (societal, socioeconomic, cultural, etc.) root causes of 
violence and crime.
13. See the concepts of “criminology of the other” in Garland (2001) and, regard-
ing legislation to control and sanction members of these groups, the concept of 
Feindstrafrecht in Jakobs (1985).
14. It is important to note that what is defined as violence and delinquency in a given 
society is highly dependent on the social context (see Huhn, Oettler, & Peetz, 
2006a, pp. 19-22).
15. Like violence or delinquency, “youth” is a social and, therefore, variable category.
16. Regarding youth gangs in Latin America in general, Strocka (2006, p. 134) notes 
that “the actual degree of violent and criminal activity is not the issue. What 
distinguishes youth gangs from other forms of youth groups is that society gener-
ally perceives the former to be . . . associated with illegal and violent activities. 
Youth gangs are socially constructed as essentially violent and criminal groups 
. . . who represent a social problem and a serious threat to society. One might 
say that gangs only exist to the extent that their existence is problematic” (italics 
in original; see also Huhn & Oettler, 2006; Huhn, Oettler, & Peetz, 2008a). For 
phenomenological information on the number of gangs and gang members, on 
the violent or illegal activities perpetrated by them, and so on (see, for example, 
Demoscopía, 2007; ERIC, IDESO, IDIES, & IUDOP, 2001; Peetz, 2005; Rubio, 
2007; Smutt & Miranda, 1998; WOLA, 2006).
17. See http://www.ocavi.com/docs_files/file_378.pdf (June 3, 2009).
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18. The percentages are calculated on the basis of the Yearbook data, accessed via 
http://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/planificacion/estadistica/judiciales/2007/
Presentaci%F3nanuario2007final.htm (June 4, 2009). What is here referred to 
as “all penal cases treated in the justice system” is the combined number of all 
cases in the categories “penal,” “violencia doméstica” (intrafamily violence), 
and “penal juvenil” (youth crime/juvenile criminal law). In Costa Rica, there are 
special judicial institutions (courts, attorneys, etc.) for cases of intrafamily vio-
lence so that these cases had to be added, in order to get the total number of cases 
generally regarded as “penal.” Without considering the “violencia doméstica” 
cases, the percentages of juvenile criminal law cases of all criminal law cases 
were 6.5% (2005), 6.4% (2006), and 6.3% (2007).
19. Accessed via http://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/planificacion/estadistica/judiciales/ 
2007/graficos/12-Fiscal%EDas%20Penales%20Adultos%20%20110-est-08% 
20Cuadros%206-8.pdf (June 4, 2009) (p. 9).
20. Accessed via http://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/planificacion/estadistica/judiciales/ 
2005/24-Juzgados%20Penales%20Juveniles%20176-182.htm (June 4, 2009) 
(sheet 182).
21. Accessed via http://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/planificacion/estadistica/judiciales/ 
2007/23-Juzgados%20Penales%20Juveniles%201389-PLA-2008%20Y%20
115-est-08.htm (June 4, 2009).
22. UNICEF data, see http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ (June 3, 2009).
23. Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front).
24. Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista (Sandinista Renewal Movement), party 
of Sandinista dissidents.
25. Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance).
26. Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (Constitutionalist Liberal Party).
27. Partido Acción Ciudadana (Citizen Action Party).
28. Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front).
29. Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance).
30. To name but a few (some referring to maras in Central America in general, but 
treating the case of El Salvador with special emphasis): Aguilar Villamariona, 
2006a; Reguillo, 2005; Savenije, 2004; WOLA, 2006.
31. The Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública is part of the prestigious Jesuit 
University UCA (Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas”).
32. See Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz (2006a, pp. 26-29) for a more detailed analysis of 
scholarly (and other) publications on the Central American youth gangs.
33. For anonymity’s sake, the students were asked to mark their respondent sheets 
with fake names.
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34. In the private school 16 out of 19 participants mention youth violence, mainly 
maras, as a serious problem in the country. In the two urban public schools (one 
in the center of San Salvador and one in Ciudad Delgado, which is part of the 
“metropolitan area” of San Salvador) the proportion is 11 out of 25 and 13 out 
of 27, respectively, and in the rural public school (in the village Las Trancas in 
Chalatenango province) 6 out of 10.
35. Private school: 4 out of 19, public school in the center of El Salvador: 14 out of 
25, public school in Ciudad Delgado: 20 out of 27, and rural school: 4 out of 10.
36. The results of a survey (IUDOP, 2006, p. 20) show a similar trend with regard 
to insecurity in general. Interviewees with an upper-class background are more 
worried about the security situation than others. Although 66.7% of upper-class 
respondents say delinquency is the most important problem in the country, the 
proportion of interviewees in the other parts of society who answer the same is 
lower: upper middle-class, 42.3%; lower middle-class, 50.8%; workers, 46.1%; 
marginalized poor, 45.0%; and rural, 47.2%.
37. As to the interviews, it does not make much sense to include quantitative 
aspects in the analysis because there is no statistical representativeness regard-
ing the number (about 30 per country) and the selection of interviewees. Also, 
in the course of some but not all the interviews, the interviewer explicitly asked 
the interview partner for a statement on youth violence or youth gangs. Nev-
ertheless, the differences between the countries should be mentioned: In El 
Salvador, 21 of all interviewees identified youth violence as a major problem 
in the country, whereas in Nicaragua 10 interview partners and in Costa Rica 
no interview partner expressed a similar preoccupation with youth violence in 
their country.
38. Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadoran 
Foundation for Economic and Social Development).
39. Not all the answers are related to maras or youth violence, but rather to insecurity 
in general. Yet, as in the Salvadoran case, the gangs are seen as the main producers 
of insecurity; thus, it can be assumed that most answers are implicitly or explicitly 
referring to that issue (among others, at least).
40. The most important repressive measures demanded by the interviewees are 
more staff and money for the police, tougher legislation, tougher judges, more 
involvement of the military and private actors in the security sector, and more 
international cooperation to prosecute gang members. The most important non-
repressive measures demanded by the interview partners are prevention, reha-
bilitation, better education, better impartment of values, urban planning, social 
justice, development/poverty reduction, change of the political system or of 
the development model, improvement of gender equality, fighting corruption, 
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prohibition of weapons, more just and more accessible justice system, strength-
ening of human rights, and community-based policing (both lists in random 
order).
41. The assertion that the younger generation as a whole has come under suspicion 
was expressed by several interview partners. A similar statement of Moser and 
Winton (2002, p. 42) is based on the results of an opinion poll.
42. In this context, the 2001 Law for the Promotion of the Integral Development of 
Youth and the creation of a Ministry of Youth in 2002 were of particular impor-
tance (see Rocha & Bellanger, 2004, pp. 311-323).
43. From the perspective of policy analysis, it is important to note that the police 
force is an actor which, in general terms, intervenes after particular policies have 
been designed (i.e., in the implementation phase of the policy cycle; see, for 
example, Jann & Wegrich, 2003, pp. 89-92), even if the “highest echelons” of the 
police may take part in the political process at an earlier stage. This article can-
not analyze how and why “street level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980)—the police 
on the local level—transform official policies in such a way that the policy out-
put significantly differs from the (expressed) intentions of higher level decision 
makers.
44. Interview with Costa Rican criminologist, Judge Douglas Durán, on November 
29, 2006.
45. On June 1, 2009, after more than 20 years of right-wing governments, left-
leaning President Mauricio Funes took office in El Salvador. When this article 
was drafted, the security policies of the new government had not yet started to be 
implemented. The information given here, thus, refers to the previous adminis-
tration’s policies.
46. The information on government policies against youth violence and youth crime 
in El Salvador presented here derives from the Salvadorian and international press 
and particularly from secondary literature like Aguilar Villamariona, 2006b, Weiss, 
2004, Reismann, 2006, and IHRC, 2007.
47. Aguilar Villamariona (2006b, pp. 88-90) refers to statistical data provided 
by the police and forensic medicine, which show that, since 2003, homicides 
in general as well as homicides and other serious offenses attributed to youth 
gangs have substantially increased. Álvarez, Fernández Zubieta, and Villareal 
Sotelo (2007, p. 115) argue that mano dura policies have contributed to the pro-
liferation and geographical dispersion of gangs: Fearing detention, gang mem-
bers migrate internally and internationally and then recruit members in their 
new environments.
48. Most probably, Cohen’s (1980) concept of “moral panic” would apply in the case 
of the public’s fear of youth gangs in El Salvador.
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